

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events



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McMahon Urges Direct Appeal to Russian People

The deliberations now occupying the Senate are being called the great debate—a term at once both apt and misleading. Great questions are assuredly being considered, and our discussions take place at a time of the greatest peril our nation has ever known. But this does not mean that great differences of opinion divide the members of this body. This Senate includes neither men of craven instincts nor warmongers.

Our bearing and demeanor must make amply clear what is in fact true—that this Senate unanimously desires to defend the United States with every power at its command, that this Senate unanimously desires to bring all the world's peoples a just and lasting peace.

We must set the record straight on another point. These walls properly resound with demands for increasing America's material strength—the strength of tanks, ships, planes and atomic bombs. Such demands are fully justified; we must generate military might.

'Sword of the Spirit'

Yet this Senate must not make the world think that America is reaching for the sword of steel as though it alone will save her. Our actions must positively demonstrate that we regard our moral position in the world as of transcendent importance—as our strongest line of defense. The massive danger now confronting our nation stems primarily from our failure to recognize the sword of the spirit as the only absolute weapon.

Today we face a military budget of \$70 billion—and even this sum will prove sadly inadequate if the arms race rushes on-

ward. Yet one supreme danger we are largely ignoring. Without firing a single shot, the Soviet Union is depriving us of our weapon prized above all others—our reputation as a nation ardently desiring

As its contribution to the "great debate," the Foreign Policy Association has invited distinguished leaders of differing opinions to present their views on the course the United States should follow in world affairs. The third article in the series appears in the adjoining columns.

peace with justice. Without sending into battle a single Russian soldier, the Kremlin threatens to win the truly decisive battle—the struggle for the minds and souls of men.

We have taken a severe propaganda beating from the Communists over the past several years, both in Europe and the Orient. The Communists have done an excellent job of selling the idea that the United States is war-minded and seeks conquest. Perhaps we cannot convince the Kremlin rulers to open up the curtain, but I am absolutely certain that we can cripple and perhaps silence the Soviet propaganda guns in the Western world.

I suggest we have a moral duty and a right to talk to the Russian people, and the Senate of the United States is the proper body to express that right. The truth is that our conduct during these past five years need give none of us cause for apology. It has been marked by great valor and fortitude and by unparalleled gener-

osity. We have exerted immense physical labors to reinvigorate a war-torn world—and those great physical exertions have been complemented by heartfelt adherence to principles no less great.

Our failure in this respect does not lie at the doorstep of any individual or any department of the government. The Voice of America, let us never forget, merely transmits policy; it does not make it. If we lay down a moral program of splendid and compelling dimensions, the Voice will do its part. Our failure to proclaim such a program is a national failure. The Congress shares in the blame; there are no scapegoats; this is not the fault of the Republicans or the Democrats. It is a fault common to all of us.

The peoples of the earth, and the Russian people especially, must know why we are rearming. They must learn that we do this only with heavy heart; they must understand that we would prefer—far prefer—to use our skills and monies for human enrichment. They must understand that we will never close the door on peace—and that there is no malice in our hearts or in our actions.

Appeal to Russian People

I therefore propose that this Senate pass a resolution expressing friendship for the people of Russia by the people of the United States. I propose that we simultaneously ask the Soviet government to make this resolution known to the Russian people.

I further propose that if such a resolution is adopted, it be circulated in every American city and hamlet and that it be signed by every American who would wel-

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come the friendship of the people of Moscow and Odessa and Vladivostok.

You will not mistake my meaning. Not for an instant do I suggest that we embrace the men who run concentration camps, pervert truth and withhold basic human rights from one-third of the world. As men of conscience, we cannot condone these frightful practices. But I am convinced that the rank-and-file Russians desire global conquest no more than we do.

The resolution might embody in plain language these plain truths:

1. That—despite what the Russian people have been told to the contrary—there are no warmongers in the United States Senate;

2. That there is not a member of the United States Senate who desires the death of a single Russian soldier or citizen;

3. That while we are resolutely determined to appropriate billions for defense, this Senate and the people of the United States ardently desire a just peace;

4. That the United States government stands ready at all times to compose its differences with the Soviet government through honorable negotiations;

5. That we ask the Soviet government—which controls all sources of informa-

tion within Russia—to publicize these facts in their newspapers and over their radio networks.

\$50 Billion for Peace

But standing by itself, the resolution is insufficient. I regard it as altogether imperative that we so express our desire to live in friendship with all the world's peoples. But we must go even further. We must demonstrate that we are willing to do our share and more in bringing about such a fraternity of mankind—and that we have a program that can lead men toward the final enshrinement of human brotherhood. Why are we not now declaring, in no uncertain terms, that the official policy of the United States Congress rests upon the two imperatives of peace: foolproof control of weapons and use of the money saved for human betterment? Why are we still waiting to tell the world, "Here is our defense money—join us in a secure system to regulate all weapons, and the money you save, along with the money we save, can be pooled through a common United Nations fund to buy bread and tractors"?

Such a proposal would say to the peoples of the East, passionately revolting

against the colonialism of the past 200 years, that we sympathize with their aspirations for equality with the Western world.

The era of colonialism is dead—let us recognize that and welcome the new movement towards political and economic freedom which has taken its place.

Their needs are not only material but of the spirit, which seeks the freedom and the equality that for so many generations men of the West have denied to their brothers in the Orient—in India, in China, in Africa.

Early last February, I pointed out that if a safe system of weapons control went into effect and if our military expenses were therefore reduced two-thirds, we would save some \$50 billion over a period of five years. I suggested that we offer to take such a sum as this \$50 billion—once the control system were proved to be airtight—and use it for Point Four programs and technical assistance to backward areas and splitting the atom for peace.

BRIEN McMAHON

(This article is excerpted from an address in the United States Senate by Senator Brien McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut, on Jan. 22, 1951. Senator McMahon is chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.)

U.S. Re-examines Policy in Light of World Changes

The reports on North Atlantic military preparedness given by General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the United States Senate on February 1 and over the radio to the American people on February 2 have put in clearer perspective the manifold problems we face in Europe. Similar reports on our prospects in Asia—at a time when the Peiping regime, as predicted by India, has rejected discussion of a cease-fire in Korea following UN condemnation of China as an aggressor—would greatly aid the formation of a sober public opinion in this country.

While some areas of basic agreement have been defined by the current debate about foreign policy, the public seems more confused than before as to the nation's long-term objectives and the methods best calculated to achieve them. As a result, unlimited self-confidence about the capacity and, in fact, the duty of the United States to lead the world alternates with a strong desire to "get away from it all" by seeking refuge in neo-isolation.

The World We Live In

The foreign policy of a nation—especially that of a great power—must be de-

veloped with reference not only to what seems desirable to that nation, but also to what is practicable in a given set of circumstances. When some of us say, "Let's rearm the Germans (or the Japanese)" or "The United Nations *must* do this or that about China or else it may crumble," then we may be offering concepts faultily or only partly analyzed to the American people as bases for policy.

Later, when it turns out that such concepts may actually be harmful to our relations with friendly nations, Administration spokesmen who support them find it difficult to change ground without "loss of face." They are haunted then by the fear that any sign of "retreat," no matter how reasonable, will redound to the political advantage of the opposition.

If there is one single thing that might be recommended as an immediate alleviation, it would be firm abstention from foreign policy manifestos, which, once events have made them obsolete or even a threat to our purposes, continue to hang around our necks like the ancient mariner's albatross. The British have found it advantageous to get along with an unwritten constitution. Might we not benefit

by having an unwritten, and hence more flexible, foreign policy?

What Are the Facts of Life?

What are the main facts of international life which we must take into account in re-examining our course in world affairs? Only a person suffering from the delusion of omniscience would venture to offer dogmatic answers. But it may be useful to suggest a list of questions—a list which everyone will of course want to amend or amplify.

Is general war the immediate prospect?

The most reliable prognostications are still that Russia does not intend to embark on a general war but will maintain the diplomatic and political pressures which in Europe are centered on bringing about the unification of Germany and preventing the rearmament of the West Germans, and in Asia are designed to weaken and eventually eliminate Western influence on the mainland. Aggression should be resisted by collective action, as the UN forces have done in Korea, whenever feasible, and the Western nations are now better prepared to check aggression by Russia than at any time since 1945. It is

generally conceded, however, that concentration of the North Atlantic community on armaments, to the detriment of ideological warfare, would facilitate Moscow's purposes.

Is the present world crisis due exclusively to Russia and communism? That was not the opinion of George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson in 1947 when they formulated the Marshall plan, which was designed to get at the roots of communism—the poverty, misery and chaos left as the by-product of two world wars. That was not the opinion of President Truman in 1949 when he proclaimed the Point Four program, designed to help nonindustrialized nations to effect the painful transition from primitive agrarian economies and recent colonial rule to economic as well as political maturity.

If the answers then given by Marshall, Acheson and Truman are valid today, are we not doing ourselves a disservice by fostering, and urging our friends abroad to accept, an oversimplified interpretation of our times which overlooks the many complex forces that are molding the modern world? Does not this interpretation lead to some unrealistic conclusions, such as that the serious tension created by the racial policy of the Malan government in South Africa is due solely to communism; or that every sign of rebellion in Latin America against economic conditions we ourselves regard as deplorable is traceable to Moscow? Are we not exaggerating the influence of Russia out of all reason, underestimating our own strength, and thereby helping Moscow's propaganda?

Must Russia inevitably control every Communist regime? The appeal of communism to the peoples of underdeveloped areas and to the less fortunate sectors of the population of Western European nations is not due in the first instance to love or admiration for Russia. It is due to a deep-seated desire for political, economic and social improvements which nations not yet industrialized believe might be most promptly achieved by adopting some, but by no means all, the techniques of production introduced by the U.S.S.R. at a comparable stage of development. The United States is in an excellent position to disprove this belief by demonstrating that it can help such nations translate their aspirations into reality without resort to dictatorship.

If we continue to identify Russia with communism and to demand the defeat of both, we may find ourselves opposing valid changes for fear that they might

benefit Russia. It seems entirely conceivable that, with the strong ascendancy of nationalism in Eastern Europe, Asia and elsewhere, several nations may adopt Communist ideas and practices without necessarily becoming dependent on Moscow. Shall we seek to bar all such countries from the international community—or can we bring ourselves to follow elsewhere the policy we are now skillfully following with respect to Yugoslavia?

In the case of China we now say we oppose Peiping's entrance into the United Nations because it is an aggressor. But is it not true that we opposed Peiping before it resorted to force in Korea? Did we oppose it then because it was a Communist regime? Does this mean that we then hoped, and still hope, to overthrow it? If that is true, and if we continue to support Chiang Kai-shek in spite of our sharp criticisms of him in the White Paper on China, can Peiping regard the United States as friendly? Shall we play into Russia's hands by acting as if we believe that the Kremlin has the power to hold any nation it chooses in permanent thrall? Or shall we make full use of the fact that Titoism has done more than any other postwar development to weaken Moscow's influence?

Would the defeat of Stalin or Mao Tse-tung completely alter the international situation? Would a non-Soviet Russia lose its traditional interest in the Balkans, the Near and Middle East, the Northwest Frontier of India, Manchuria? Would it no longer care what happened in Germany and Japan? Would China act on the belief that it should have no voice in determining the future of Japan and Korea? It might be well to remember that Tsarist Russia regarded Germany as a threat, and Japan was viewed by China as a menace when it was ruled by Chiang Kai-shek.

Democracy and Dictatorship

Is the choice in most of the world outside of the Atlantic region between democracy of the Western type and Communist dictatorship, between American free enterprise and Russian communism? Or is it a choice between two forms of dictatorship, such as we find in China with Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, and between degrees of socialization, such as we find in many parts of Europe and Asia? We must constantly search for ways of helping any group that seeks to create a "vital center"—but we have to recognize that illiterate and underfed peoples cannot achieve democracy

overnight or carry out far-reaching reforms without at least some government controls.

If we admit that dictatorship of one kind or another may prove to be the way of life in many countries for years to come, should we see that dictatorships receiving our aid should at least improve the lot of their peoples, mistaken as their methods may seem to us? If we think it necessary for strategic reasons to help Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa and Franco in Spain, would it not be better from the point of view of propaganda to say this instead of listing Chiang and Franco as crusaders for democracy?

Have Germany and Japan undergone fundamental changes? It is natural for us to want to believe that we have succeeded in making the German and Japanese systems "democratic" during five years of occupation and to erase from our memories—if not from the memories of their victims—the organized cruelties they committed during World War II. If we really believe this, however, we may experience a shock when we discover the price the Germans and Japanese hope to extract from us in return for their aid against Russia. In this respect General Eisenhower on Germany and John Foster Dulles on Japan have performed a great public service by pointing out that if our former enemies want to have the right to rearm, they must win it by their own efforts. But can we hope to "democratize" Germany and Japan if we expect the Germans and Japanese to welcome the return to power of military and industrial leaders who once before took them into war?

This, however, raises the most fundamental question of all. In our own current political situation, when conservatives have won the upper hand in the Democratic party and liberal Republicans have been relegated to the background by their own party extremists, the United States may face new problems in seeking to lead other peoples along the road of reform. The Economic Cooperation Administration has blazed a promising trail by its efforts to persuade recipients of American aid—notably Greece, Italy and the Philippines—to modernize their economies and introduce social improvements. This is desirable not only because the United States will not want, over the long run, to have ECA countries as permanent pensioners on its rolls, but because every move in the direction of economic and social betterment represents the most effective way of combating communism. There

is no reason for the defeatism in this country which today worries Administration leaders. It is easy enough to denounce Mr. Acheson and to demand that he be replaced. But neither Mr. Acheson nor anyone who may have the temerity to succeed him can carry out successfully this country's ultimate aims of averting war and creating conditions of world prosperity and stability unless the American people understand and vigorously support constructive efforts to improve economic and social conditions side by side with efforts to forge weapons against aggression.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

PHILADELPHIA, February 9, 10, Conference on Foreign Policy in Cooperation with the State Department, W. Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk
DETROIT, February 13, *Nationalism vs. Communism in Asia*, Marquis Childs
BOSTON, February 15, *Can Our Cultural Achievements Be Exported?*, Paul Chalmers, Augusta Mandosso

EASTON, February 15, *Middle East—Area of Conflict*, Edwin M. Wright
NEW YORK, February 15, *Britain and the Defense of the Free World*, Alistair Cooke
POUGHKEEPSIE, February 15, *Russia: An Historian's Analysis*, Hans Kohn
MILWAUKEE, February 16, *Revolution in the Far East*, Warren J. Holmes
PHILADELPHIA, February 16, Secondary School Forum
ST. LOUIS, February 16, 17, Missouri State Conference on Foreign Policy in Cooperation with the State Department, Edward Barrett
BETHLEHEM, February 19, *Pakistan in World Affairs*, M. A. O. Baig
NEW YORK, February 19, *Britain and the Defense of the Free World*, Alistair Cooke
PHILADELPHIA, February 20, Model UN Assembly
PITTSBURGH, February 20, *Asia's Challenge to the West*, Col. M. Thomas Tchou, Preston Schoyer, Channing Liem
BOSTON, February 22, *Is Russia Weaker Than We Think?*, Alex Inkeles, W. H. Chamberlin
ST. LOUIS, February 22, *Point Four*, Brooks Emeny
PHILADELPHIA, February 23, Student Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, Hon. Paul H. Douglas
ST. LOUIS, February 23, *Strategic Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emeny

News in the Making

GRAIN FOR INDIA: Prospects for sending 2 million tons of surplus American grain to India to avert a threatened famine brightened with the disclosure on February 2 that a bipartisan group of 24 Senators and Representatives are prepared to sponsor enabling legislation. Congressional sentiment outside the group of sponsors also appeared favorable. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, indicated he would back the legislation even though he disagreed with India's policy in the United Nations.

DEFENSE OF YUGOSLAVIA: Growing military preparations reported in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania have caused the United States to exchange views with Britain, France, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece concerning joint defense measures which might be taken in the event of any hostile actions against the government of Marshal Tito.

GERMAN ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY?: Important modifications in the structure of German industry may result from the success of the German Federation of Labor in obtaining "co-determination"—that is, an equal say with ownership in the management of the iron, coal and steel industry. At the same time agreement on the Schuman plan for merging these industries in Western Europe is being held up by refusal of German industrialists to accept proposed decartelization provisions. The release on February 3 of Alfred Krupp, head of the famous munitions concern, as one of 33 former Nazis whose prison terms had been commuted, may strengthen the resistance to modification of the cartel system.

MERGER OF AID UNITS: According to a dispatch from London in *The New York Times* of February 4, Washington's plan to merge overseas aid groups into two organizations—one charged with economic matters and the other with military affairs—is nearing completion. The coordination, representing a joint effort by the State and Defense departments, will be in line with the recommendations made in the Gray report on November 10, 1950.

FPA Bookshelf

HUMAN RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF GROWING PRESSURES

Great Expressions of Human Rights, edited by R. M. MacIver. New York & London, Institute for Religious and Social Studies, distributed by Harper, 1950. \$2.50.

A collection of 14 essays analyzing historic statements on human rights—the original documents are printed in the appendix—ranging from Micah and Confucius through Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly.

Civil Rights in the United States, by Allison Reppy. New York, Central Book Co., 1951. \$4.50.

A comprehensive analysis by the Dean of the New York Law School of the legal and constitutional basis of civil rights in this country, with particular emphasis on developments in the last few years.

Security Loyalty, and Science, by Walter Gellhorn. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1950. \$3.

A scholarly and disturbing report on the secrecy restrictions imposed on scientists conducting atomic research or otherwise engaged in work affecting national security. The author concludes that undue secrecy, while necessary in certain cases, impedes scientific progress and actually injures national security rather than promotes it.

Witch Hunt: The Revival of Heresy, by Carey McWilliams. Boston, Little, Brown, 1950. \$3.50.

A trenchant examination of the sociological basis and long-range significance of the "loyalty" investigations based on close study of recent cases

and developments in the United States. The author finds heresy-hunting symptomatic of weakness, contradictions and tensions in a society suffering from major dislocations, and contends that far from contributing to the destruction of communism it may actually speed the triumph, if not of a Marxist, at least of some other form of tyranny.

The Year of the Oath: The Fight for Academic Freedom at the University of California, by George R. Stewart and others. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1950. \$2.

Communism and Academic Freedom: The Record of the Tenure Cases at the University of Washington, presented by Board of Regents, University of Washington. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1949. \$1.50.

Two important case studies of the application of principles of academic freedom, the first involving the refusal of many faculty members, admittedly not themselves Communists, to sign a special non-Communist oath; the second involving the discharge from the faculty of Communist party members. The first is critical of the Regents who attempted to impose the oath; the second defends the action of the University administration.

Freedom of Information, A Compilation, Vol. I., *Comments of Governments*. Lake Success, N. Y., UN, Dept. of Social Affairs, 1950. \$3.50. (Sales No. 1950. XIV. 1. Vol. 1)

Replies from governments to requests for information circulated in connection with the UN's work on freedom of information.

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